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MANAGING PERSONAL DEVICE USE IN THE
WORKPLACE: HOW TO AVOID DATA SECURITY
ISSUES AND TO DIG YOURSELF OUT OF YOUR
FAILED BYOD POLICY
I.

INTRODUCTION

First coined in 2001, the term the "Consumerization of Information
Technology" describes the reorientation of the IT industry towards the
immense potential of consumer technologies in lowering costs and
improving corporate IT infrastructure.' This reorientation resulted from
booming development in IT innovation and growth in the consumer
market, requiring a firm to match the norms established by consumer
technologies which have become the expectation of customers and
employees. 2 Smartphones and tablets, with mainstream adoption outpacing
any comparable technology in human history, have enabled employees to
conduct business on the fly without the provision of business-use IT
equipment by the employer.3 The consequence of this rampant innovation
is the availability of sophisticated IT at the employee's market level, with
such sophistication at a magnitude that enables the "dual-use" of an
employee's personal consumer device for the conducting of the employer's
4
business .
A recent survey by Cisco and Redshirt Research indicates that 48%
of companies globally would not authorize the use of personal devices for
work.5 The same survey also found that 57% of companies reported their
1 See David Moschella, What the Consumerization of IT Means to your Business, Ten
Messages
for
CxOs,
LEADING
EDGE
FORUM
(Jun.
23,
2011),
http://lef.csc.com/blog/post/2011/06/what-the-consumerization-of-it-means-to-your-business-tenmessages-for-cxos (reviewing trend of consumerization of IT).
2 See id. (noting firms must be "customer-centric" due to expectations employees have as
consumers of technology).
3 See Michael Degusta, Are Smart Phones SpreadingFasterthan Any Technology in Human
History?, MIT TECH. REV. (May 9, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/427787/are-

smart-phones-spreading-faster-than-any-technology-in-human-history/ (comparing smartphone
and tablet consumer market penetration rates to penetration rates of other technologies).

4 See GARRY G. MATHIASON ET AL., LITTLER REP., THE 'BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE' TO
WORK MOVEMENT: ENGINEERING PRACTICAL EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW COMPLIANCE

SOLUTIONS 1 (May 2012), available at http://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/TheLittlerReportTheBringYourOwnDeviceToWorkMovement.pdf (discussing prevalence of personal device use
for business purposes in workplace).
5 See Michelle Drolet, BYOD Brings on a War of Worry, BOSTINNO (Jan. 25, 2013),
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employees were nevertheless using personal devices without their
employer's consent. 6 Unrestricted and unregulated use of personal devices
in the workplace exposes employers to significant liability; employers may
be responsible for the safeguarding of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential
information created or received in the course of business.7 In an effort to
insulate itself from liability, an employer might then monitor and regulate
personal devices used to conduct business on the employer's behalf, either
unilaterally or through the implementation of a Bring Your Own Device
("BYOD") policy. 8 In either undertaking, the employer risks exposure to
liability for the violation of liberally-applied privacy laws now entering the
workplace. 9
This note will discuss the litigation of unauthorized access or
privacy claims by employees generally, the mechanics of permissibly
regulating employee personal device use in the workplace, and finally, the
bastardization of anti-hacking and privacy laws wrongfully applied in the
employment context. First, there will be a discussion outlining the sources
of privacy and confidentiality obligations with respect to certain
information through (i) state and federal law requirements and (ii)
contractual confidentiality mandates. O
Then an employer's binate
liabilities associated with personal device use in the workplace will be
further distilled: (i) liability arising from the failure to safeguard, preserve,
or destroy sensitive data; and (ii) liability arising from an employer's
monitoring of employees to safeguard the aforementioned sensitive data."i
With respect to the former, there will be a discussion of various
confidentiality provisions commonly found in commercial contracts, as
well as federal and Massachusetts law governing personal or confidential
information. 12 In regards to the latter, this note will outline the relevant
federal and state law and common law principles applicable to the
monitoring of employees. 3

http://bostinno.streetwise.co/channels/byod-brings-on-a-war-of-worry/ (discussing reasoning for
and mechanics of BYOD programs, and risk factors associated therewith).
6 See id.
(discussing prevalence of prohibited personal device use by employees).
7 See infra Part II.B (outlining potential statutory and contractual obligations to safeguard
certain information).
8 MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 (defining and rationalizing trend toward BYOD
policy implementation).
9 See infra Part III (discussing liability inherent in monitoring employees); Part IV (arguing
certain privacy laws are inappropriate to apply in BYOD context).
10 See infra Part II.

11See infra Parts 11I1 (outlining potential liability of employers in regards to sensitive
information handled in course of business).
12 See infra Part II.B (discussing confidentiality obligations incidental to modem business).
13 See infra Part III.
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There will then be an analysis of an employer's potential litigation
strategies pertaining to unauthorized access and privacy claims by
aggrieved employees by way of analogy of the judicial treatment of claims
arising from employer-owned device use.' 4
Further, there will be
suggestions offered for employers wishing to insulate themselves from
liability through the use of properly drafted employee policies, with
conclusions regarding employee personal device use in the workplace in
light of the liability it creates and the potential to mitigate it. 15 Finally,
editorial conclusions will be made regarding the inappropriate application
of federal anti-hacking and privacy laws in the employment context. 16
II.

DATA SECURITY ISSUES IN THE COURSE OF MODERN
BUSINESS

A. Causes and Implications of Security BreachesResultingfrom Personal
Device Usefor ConductingEmployer's Business
The past two decades have been accompanied by unprecedented
data security breaches, both in scope and in damages. 17 Recently, major
retailers Home Depot and Target have fallen victim to various types of data
security incidents. 8 In just one quarter, Home Depot incurred forty-three
million dollars in costs related to the compromising of fifty-six million
credit cards and fifty-three million email addresses when hackers gained
access to IT infrastructure using a vendor's login credentials. 19 The data
breach which compromised the credit cards of roughly twelve million
Target customers through the installation of malicious software on credit
card machines cost the company one hundred forty-eight million dollars in
a single quarter. 20 While third party hacking caused these breaches, it has

14 See infra Part IV (providing litigation strategies for employers wishing to distinguish
applicability of federal statutes).
15 See infra Parts IV-V (concluding that personal device use should be prohibited, but
formally regulated if permitted).
16 See infra Part V (arguing CFAA and SCA wrongfully applied in employment contexts).
17 See World's Biggest Data Breaches, INFORMATION IS BEAUTIFUL (Feb. 5, 2015),

http://www.infonnationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/
(aggregating information on significant data breaches).
18 See id. (describing gravity of damages).
19 See The Home Depot, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 7 (November 2, 2014).
Costs incurred were a result of identity protection and credit monitoring services offered to
compromised shoppers, increased call center staffing, and legal and other professional services
related to managing the breach. Id.
20 See Rachel Abrams, Target Puts DataBreach Costs at $148 Million, andForecasts Profit
Drop, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/business/target-puts-
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been estimated that the average loss resulting from a security breach arising
from any source is roughly $7 million, averaging $201 per lost or stolen
record across major industries. 2' On average, a data breach arising from a
lost or stolen device costs eighteen dollars more per record than a data
breach not arising from the same.22
A study by the Ponemon Institute (financed by IBM) for 2013 and
2014 estimated that 310% of organizations experienced a data breach due to
an employee's negligence, and 37% by a malicious or criminal attack.23
What is quite problematic is that 46% of data breach incidents involved lost
or stolen devices, including smartphones and tablets.24 For example, in
2009 the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs settled a lawsuit brought by
veterans groups for twenty million dollars, after a laptop was stolen in 2006
which potentially exposed more than twenty-six million records.25 More
recently, Advocate Medical Group in Chicago gained infamy for its
involvement in the second largest HIPAA violation in history after four
unencrypted laptops containing Social Security numbers and dates of birth
were stolen from an administrative building in July 2014, necessitating the
notification of more than four million patients.26 The aforementioned
examples are just those worth mentioning; less notable data breaches
involving lost or stolen devices happen quite frequently.27
data-breach-costs-at-148-million.html?_r-0 (reporting on ramifications of Target data breach).
21 PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2014 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: UNITED STATES 2 (May
2014)
available
at
http://www935.ibm.com/services/multimedia/SEL03027USEN Poneman 2014 Cost of Data Breach Stud

y.pdf (quantifying financial losses resulting from security breaches). Businesses experiencing
security breaches in 2013 and 2014 incurred on average $3.2 million in lost business costs
resulting from customer turnover, increased efforts to reacquire customers, and loss of reputation
and goodwill. Id. The report cited provides further cost detail by industry in the Appendix
attached hereto. Id.
22 See PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 9 (illustrating several factors that increase
costs when present in data breach)
23 See id at 8 (summarizing common causes of data breaches).
24 See id. at 9 (listing key factors affecting costs and of data breaches).
25

See Terry Frieden, VA Will Pay $20 million to Settle Lawsuit Over Stolen Laptop's Data,

CNN
(Jan.
27,
2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/0 1/27/va.data.theft/index.html?eref-onion
(discussing
legal implications of stolen laptop of data analyst for U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs).
26 See Patrick Ouellete, Advocate Medical Group Endures Massive Data Breach, HEALTH IT
SECURITY (Aug. 27, 2013), http://healthitsecurity.com/2013/08/27/advocate-medical-groupendures-massive-data-breach/ (reporting Advocate Medical Group data breach details).
27 See
Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE,
www.privacyrights.org/data-breach (last updated Dec. 13, 2013) (select "Portable device (Port)"
checkbox; select each "organization type(s)"; select each "year"; then select "GO!") (cataloging
data breaches publicly reported). For example, on January 29, 2015, Riverside County Regional
Medical Center in Moreno Valley, California provided twelve months of credit monitoring
services following the theft of a laptop containing sensitive patient information used in its
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Aside from the physical dispossession of a mobile device, other
security risks include viruses, shared use with friends and family, and cloud
computing. 2218 Viruses and other malware account for 13% of security
breaches, likely attributable to the 155% increase in volume for malware
tailored for mobile devices from 2010 to 2011.29 Shared use of a device
with friends and family also poses a significant risk to corporate data
security; the U.S. Treasury Department found that between 2003 and 2009,
27.5% of suspicious activity reports filed by depository institutions were
instances where the victim of identity theft knew the thief, typically a
friend, family member, or employee of the victim. g
Finally, cloud
computing poses a significant risk to employers in that sensitive
information is uploaded and secured by third party vendors by the
employee device, often without any oversight by the employer, potentially
violating many of the federal regulations or contractual obligations that will
be outlined in the proceeding paragraphs. 3" Cloud services Evernote and
Dropbox have been subject to data breach incidents in recent years, with
the former requesting that fifty million (50,000,000) users change their
passwords following an unsuccessful attempt to access
the information of
32
Evernote Business and Evernote Premium customers.
B. Obligationsof Employers With Respect to SafeguardingSensitive
Information
1. Statutory Obligations to Secure Sensitive Information
Employers face both federal and state law mandates requiring
adequate security of sensitive corporate data.33 For example, data security
Ophthalmology and Dermatology clinics. Id. In December 23, 2014, Rob Kirby CPA in Santa
Rosa, California suffered a data breach when his vehicle was broken into and a briefcase, laptop,
and flash drive containing confidential information was stolen. Id. The query used to find this
information returned 1073 breaches between 2005 and 2015. Id.
28 See id. at 10-11 (outlining various security risks to storing corporate data on mobile
devices).
29 See JUNIPER NETWORKS, 2011 MOBILE THREATS REPORT 6 (Feb. 2012), available at
http://www.juniper.net/us/en/local/pdf/addifional-resources/jnpr-20 11-mobile-threatsreport.pdt~utm source-promo&utm-medium-rightjpromo&utm campaign-mobile threat repo
rt 0212 (discussing increasing risk and prevalence of malicious software).
30 See MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at 11 (finding that identity theft victims are often
familiar with offender).
31 See MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at 11-12. (warning employers of possible
applicability of federal law to cloud storage); see also infra Part II.B (outlining federal and state
law obligations to secure certain sensitive information).
32 See World 'sBiggest Data Breaches, supra note 17 (summarizing hacking incident).
33 See, e.g., Security standards: General rules, 45 C.F.R. 164.306 (2013) (requiring "covered
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mandates exist in two notable pieces of federal legislation: the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") and the GrammLeach-Bliley Act.34 HIPAA requires hospitals, healthcare providers, and
insurers to implement administrative, physical, and technical safeguards for
the security of "protected health information. 3 5 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act similarly requires the protection of information created or received by a
financial institution in connection with the customer relationship.3 6
States have also imposed broad obligations on businesses that
collect or store sensitive information.3 7 Massachusetts imposes upon every
person the obligation to implement appropriate safeguards to protect
information about a resident.38 Recognizing the increased risk posed by the
use of mobile devices in the workplace, Massachusetts regulations
specifically require security safeguards for personal information stored on
laptops or other portable devices.3 9 The Massachusetts Attorney General
has enforced these regulations against businesses failing to abide by
imposed information
security obligations, obtaining monetary penalties in
40
some instances.

entities" to "ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic protected health
information ...[p]rotect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to security ...
[p]rotect against any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of such information that are not
permitted ...
[e]nsure compliance with this subpart by its workforce"); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2013) (requiring broadly defined "financial institutions" to "insure the security
and confidentiality of customer records and information ...[to] protect against any anticipated
threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such records ...[and to] protect against
unauthorized access to or use of such records or information...."); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00
(2015) (implementing Massachusetts law requiring safeguarding of personal information of
Massachusetts citizens).
34 See sources cited, supra note 33 (establishing benchmarks for corporate held data).
3' 45 C.F.R. 164.302-164.306 (2013) (defining security standards and mandating
the
implementation of safeguards and security procedures).
36 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09 (2014) (imposing security mandates for information created or
received by financial institutions); see MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at 12 ("[Flinancial
institution [includes] not only banks but also car dealerships that extend credit and even some
travel agencies....").
37 See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (outlining employer's statutory obligations to
secure sensitive information).
38 201 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17.03 (2015) (requiring administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards" for personal devices).
39 See 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04(5) (2013) (requiring "encryption of all personal
information stored on laptops or other portable devices"); supra Part II.A (discussing security
breaches caused by malicious software).
40 See Ellen Giblin, Massachusetts Extends Reach of Data Protection Regulations,
WORKPLACE
PRIVACY
COUNSEL
(May
18,
2011),
available
at
http://www.littler.com/2011/05/articles/state-law-claims/massachusetts-extends-reach-of-dataprotection-regulations (noting new causes of action available for security breach victims where
private action previously nonexistent). The enforcement cited in the article, based upon a
violation of Chapter 93A consumer protection law, resulted in a judgment against The Briar
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Massachusetts, and forty-six other states, requires notification of
security breaches involving personal information. 41 A person or agency
storing personal information is required to notify the victim of a security
breach and the Attorney General if it knows or has reason to know of a
security breach or that information was acquired or used by an
42
unauthorized person.
When protected information is disseminated without an employer's
knowledge, an employee may expose the employer to liability for failing to
safeguard information in a manner required by law. 43 The previously cited
Massachusetts Regulation section 17.03 requires entities holding personal
information to develop and implement security programs and to oversee
security providers.4 4 If the protected information is uploaded to Dropbox, a
consumer cloud-based storage provider who has suffered its own data

breach, the employer has not taken steps to oversee, select, or retain its
third party service provider, nor has it required the service provider by
contract to safeguard the information as required by law. 45 Further,
Group, a restaurant chain, for:
(a) failing to change default usernames and passwords on its point-of-sale computer
system, (b) allowing multiple employees to share common usernames and passwords, (c)
failing to properly secure its remote access utilities and wireless network, (d) continuing
to accept credit and debit cards from customers after the company knew that its systems
were compromised but had not yet been secured, (e) storing payment card personal
information in clear (i.e., unencrypted) text on its servers ...
Id. Giblin suggests that the judgment's basis on the consumer protection law, Chapter 93A, is
indicative of the potential for private causes of action by residents, provided that harm resulting
from failure to comply with the data security regulations can be proven. Id.
41 See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, State Security
Breach Notification Laws,
available
at
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (last updated Aug. 20, 2012) (listing state
statutes requiring notification of security breaches involving personal information).
42 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 1-3 (2012) (explaining obligations of entity maintaining
or
storing resident's personal information to notify of breach). Notification is only required upon a
"breach of security," where "unencrypted data or, encrypted electronic data and the confidential
process or key that is capable of compromising the security .
is acquired without authorization.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H §§ 1(a), 3(a)-3(b) (2012).
43 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, §§ 1-3. Notwithstanding instances where the employer
has utilized Mobile Device Management Software (MDM) to restrict transfer or use of protected
information on the employee-owned personal device. See MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at
11 (discussing issues regarding unbridled dissemination of protected information); see also supra
Part 11.A.
44 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(2)(f)(1)-(2) (2013) ("[R]easonable steps [taken] to
select
and retain third-party service providers that are capable of maintaining appropriate security
measures to protect such personal information ...[and] [r]equiring such third-party service
providers by contract to implement and maintain such appropriate security measures for personal
information ...").
45 See id.(requiring certain measures to ensure information security); see also MATHIASON
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because Massachusetts requires encryption of data disseminated to portable
devices such as laptops and smartphones, the employer will have
failed to
46
adequately encrypt data that its employee has now disseminated.
2. Contractual Obligations to Secure Sensitive Information
Common in commercial contracts are obligations to safeguard the
confidential information disclosed in the course of the performance of an
agreement, with such obligations arising in the contract itself or under a
nondisclosure agreement ancillary thereto.47 These provisions may require
that information be kept in strict confidence, using language similar to the
following:
Consultant agrees to retain and maintain in strict
confidence, and to require its representatives, agents,
employees, officers, directors, shareholders, partners,
principals, successors, assignees, members, affiliates,
consultants, or professional representatives and advisors to
retain in confidence any and all Confidential Information
of the Company. Consultant agrees that, without the prior
express written consent of the Company, Consultant shall
not, either directly or indirectly, individually or in concert
with others: (i) Disclose any such Confidential Information
to any other Person; (ii) use any such Confidential
Information for the benefit of any Person other than the
Company; or (iii) permit any Confidential Information to
be Disclosed to or used by any Person other than the
Company.48
Less draconian, and frankly, likely to be less offensive in

ET AL., Supra note 4, at 11 (discussing risk associated with unregulated transfer of protected
information disseminated to employees' personal devices). Dropbox itself suffered a data breach
when one of its own employee's Dropbox account containing customer information was
compromised. See Dropbox Confirms Security Breach, INFORMATION AGE (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://www.infonnation-age.com/technology/security/2114488/dropbox-confirms-security-breach

(reporting Dropbox data breach and its cause).
46 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (defining obligations of person holding
personal information of a resident to notify upon breach).
47 Jere M. Webb, A Practitioner's Guide to Confidentiality Agreements, at 1,
http://www.stoel.com/files/confidentialityagreementguide.pdf (stating that use of confidentiality

agreements has become pervasive).
48

ALAN GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS §107:72 (2015) (providing

sample confidentiality provision based upon standard of reasonableness).
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negotiation, would be the following mutually protective language to
safeguard confidential information using a standard of reasonableness:
Both parties acknowledge that, by reason of their
relationship, they may have access to certain information
and materials concerning the other's business, plans, and
products (including, but not limited to, information and
materials contained in technical data provided to the other
party) which is confidential and of substantial value to the
other party, which value would be impaired if such
information were disclosed to third parties. Neither party
shall use in any way, for their own account or the account
of any third party, nor disclose to any third party, any such
confidential information which is disclosed in written form
to it by the other party hereto, without written
authorization from the other party. If information is
disclosed verbally, in order for it to be deemed confidential
information it must be followed by a written summary
within [number of days] days of such disclosure. Each
party will take every reasonable precaution to protect the
confidentiality of such information consistent with the
efforts exercised by it with respect to its own confidential
information. Each party shall advise the other if it
considers any particular information or materials to be
confidential. This provision shall survive termination of
this Agreement.49
In the event of a data breach, or other prohibited disclosure during
the normal course of business, an employer permitting the use of personal
devices to conduct business on its behalf without sufficient regulation or
security would certainly constitute a breach in the first contract cited, and
would likely constitute a breach in the second contract cited.>°

49 Id. §120:244 (providing sample confidentiality provision requiring strict maintenance of
information confidentiality).
50 See id. (citing provision requiring parties to take reasonable precaution to protect

confidential information); see also id. §120:244 (citing provision requiring parties to maintain
confidential information in strict confidence).
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C. Employer Obligations to Destroy or Retain Information on EmployeeOwned Devices Usedfor Conducting Employer's Business

1. Statutory Obligations to Destroy or Retain Information
Massachusetts, along with twenty-eight other states, requires
businesses and agencies to destroy or erase personal information in a

manner that it cannot be practicably read or reconstructed. 51 Employers
holding personal information of Massachusetts residents face fines up to
$50,000 per instance of improper disposal of personal information.52 As
data is unknowingly disseminated to personal devices, an employer's
compliance with the statute is increasingly frustrated due to the difficulty in
accounting for all pieces of unregulated, disseminated data that may require

proper destruction.53
In contrast, employers have a duty to preserve information as
evidence when litigation is "pending or reasonably foreseeable."54 The
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure require the production of potential
evidence which is in the "possession, custody or control" of the party upon
whom the request is served.55 The First Circuit has held that a party has
control over evidence "if that party has a legal right to obtain those
51 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 931, § 2 (2012) (promulgating "minimum standards for proper
disposal of records containing personal information'). Personal information is defined as "a
resident's first name [or initial] and last name ... in combination with any 1 or more of the
following ... (a) Social Security Number; (b) driver's license number ... ; (c) financial account
number, or credit or debit card number ... ; or a (d) biometric indicator." § 1 (defining personal
information subject to data disposal requirements); see NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
Data Disposal Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-infonnationtechnology/data-disposal-laws.aspx (last updated Jan. 21, 2015) (listing states imposing minimum
standards on businesses and government agencies for data disposal).
52 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 931, § 2 (establishing penalties for failure to comply with
proper data disposal requirements).
53 See generally, MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at 12-30. (discussing data related issues
of employee personal device use).
54 See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing
spoliation of evidence); see also Kronischv. U.S., 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[T]he party
having control over the evidence must have had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was
destroyed. This obligation to preserve evidence arises ... also on occasion in other circumstances,
as for example when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future
litigation"). The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure are "interpret[ed] ... consistently with
... their Federal counterparts absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences
in content." Strom v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. 667 N.E.2d 1137, 1140-41 (Mass. 1996)
(citation omitted) (quoting Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co., KG, 507 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Mass. 1987)
and Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 330 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Mass. 1975)) (noting discovery
issues at bar "follow the course of federal decisions where they seem sensible").
55 See MASS. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1) (codifying party's ability to request production of
documents or electronically stored information).
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documents," rather than considering legal ownership as the determining
factor.5 6 The First Circuit also requires notice to opposing parties of the
existence of evidence controlled by third parties.57 If the employer fails to
take the appropriate measures to preserve information within its or a third
party's control, it may be subject to spoliation sanctions during litigation.58
2. Contractual Obligations to Destroy or Return Sensitive
Information
Common in confidentiality provisions is the obligation to return or
certify the destruction of the disclosing party's confidential information.59
More than half of employees have stored, transferred, or modified their
employers' documents on employee personal devices.60
Of course, it
would be quite difficult to certify the destruction of information, or to
corral information to return to the discloser if such information was freely
distributed among the receiving party's employees or officers and their
personal devices.6i
III. LIABILITY ARISING FROM EMPLOYER MONITORING AND
ACCESS OF EMPLOYEE PERSONAL DEVICES USED TO CONDUCT
EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS
A. StatutoryProtectionsAgainst CertainElectronicAccess or Intrusions
Given the immense liability associated with the dissemination of
56 See MATHIASON ET AL., supra

note 4, at 57 (defining control in context of evidence

subject to discovery).
57 See Velez v. Marriot PR Mgmt., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 235, 258 (D.P.R. 2008) ("Litigants
have the responsibility of ensuring that relevant evidence is protected from loss or destruction
[and this] ... duty extends to giving notice if the evidence is in the hands of third parties.").
58 See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("[N]oting
that [a] spoliation sanction is proper where (1) a party has a duty to preserve evidence because it
knew, or should have known, that litigation was imminent, and (2) the adverse party was
prejudiced by the destruction of the evidence.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
59 See Return or Destruction of Confidential Information, CONTRACT STANDARDS,
http://www.contractstandards.com/clauses/return-or-destruction-of-confidential-information
(select "Discloser" hyperlink) (providing sample contract language and noting prevalence of
destruction or return mandates).
60 See Tom Kaneshige, Confidential Data is Leaving on Workers' Mobile Devices, CIO
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.cio.com/article/2382912/byod/confidential-data-is-leaving-onworkers-mobile-devices.html (arguing that few employees, especially millennials, are aware of
their company's BYOD policy).
61 See id. (noting BYOD policies may not safeguard employer because employees "play
loose with corporate documents").
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various types of protected information, employers may wish to monitor the
activity of personal devices when used for business purposes.62 Extensive
monitoring of employer-owned equipment has been commonplace for
several years now, with sixty-six percent of employers monitoring
employee internet use, forty-three percent monitoring email, and sixteen
percent recording phone calls.63 Such monitoring however, may be subject
to statutory protections against unauthorized access by the employer or an
employee's expectation of privacy.64 It is therefore worth noting that
sixteen percent of employers do not apprise employees of phone
conversation monitoring, and twenty-seven percent of employers do not
notify that voicemails are monitored.65 Further, the use of the personal
device for conducting business may enhance the employer's exposure to
liability for an employee's inappropriate use of the device. 66
Enacted in 1986, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA")
imposes criminal and civil liability for whoever "having knowingly
accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access.
. obtain[ing] information... from a protected computer," or "intentionally
accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result ...
causes damage and loss. ' ' 67 While "exceeding authorization" is defined in
62 See infra Part IV (providing preventative measures with respect to unauthorized access or

employee privacy claims); see also Moschella, supra note 1 (discussing risks posed by BYOD
programs and employer efforts to mitigate them).
63 See The Latest on Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, AMERICAN MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION,
(last
updated
Nov.
17,
2014),
available
at
http://www.amanet.org/training/articles/The-Latest-on-Workplace-Monitoring-andSurveillance.aspx (presenting survey findings on percentage of employers monitoring
employees).
64 See infra Part III.A (outlining liability of employer for unauthorized access, and providing
arguments for their defense, respectively).
65 See The Latest on Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, supra note 63 (noting trends
regarding employers informing personnel regarding certain monitoring).
66 MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at 35-39 (discussing effect of personal device use on
employer liability for hostile work environment and discrimination). While an employer's
liability exposure in this regard may or may not be enhanced by the use of personal devices, for
the purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the use of personal devices at the very least accords
the same risk to employers as employer-owned devices. See id. (same).
67 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2013). Congress cited the proliferation of computers and digital data
in American society that has led to the "creat[ion] of a new type of criminal one who uses
computers to steal, to defraud, and to abuse the property of others." S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2480
(1986) (justifying need for criminalization of computer-based frauds and abuses); see §§
1030(a)(2)(C), (a)(5)(C) ("[I]mposing criminal and civil liability for] access[ing] a computer
without authorization or exceeding authorized access, and by means of such conduct having
obtained information ... causing damage or loss"). Exceeding authorized access is defined as
accessing "a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in
the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter." § 1030(e)(6) (2013).
Computers are defined in the statute as an "electronic... or other high speed data processing
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Because the statute could

reasonably be construed quite broadly, Congress was concerned with the
potential applicability of the statute to innocuous computer access, and
included safeguards such as a damages threshold or scienter requirement.69
Further, all fifty states have laws paralleling the CFAA, typically in the

device ...
and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or
operating in conjunction with such device .... 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (defining "computer").
Acknowledging that the language of the statute is exceedingly broad, courts have found that the
definition "captures any device that makes use of a [sic] electronic data processor, examples of
which are legion." United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that
cellular phones are within contemplation of the CFAA's definition of "computer"). A computer
is "protected" if it "is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication ......
§ 1030(e)(2)(B) (defining "protected computer").
68 See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Feldstein, 951 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217-18 (D. Mass.
2013) (noting First Circuit has not articulated position on breadth of interpretation of "without
authorization."); Guest-Tek Interactive Entm't, Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 43 (D. Mass.
2009) (recognizing that "without authorization" is not defined in the CFAA). Some First Circuit
courts, as well as other circuits, advocate a narrower interpretation of "without authorization"
under the CFAA. See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d at 217; see also LVRC
Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2009) (using "plain language of the
statute" and dictionary definition of "authorization" to determine violation). Although Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. involved 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), requiring intent to defraud, the Court
recognized the lack of articulation by the First Circuit regarding the breadth of interpretation for
application of the CFAA, before ultimately deciding to use a narrow interpretation. See
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d at 217. Other First Circuit courts have used a
broader interpretation, a product of the lack of a definition provided by the statute. See Guest-Tek
Interactive Entm 't, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (recognizing that "without authorization" is not
defined in the CFAA); see also EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582-84
(1st Cir. 2001) (finding former employees, despite previous authorization, violated CFAA for
access without authorization). The Guest-Tek court ultimately recognized the First Circuit Court
of Appeals' other broad interpretations of the CFAA, finding that wherever an employee breaches
a contractual obligation, their authorization to access information stored on an employer's
computer terminates and all subsequent access is unauthorized. See Guest-Tek Interactive
Entm 't, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 45 ("Employers ...are increasingly taking advantage of the
CFAA's civil remedies to sue former employees and their new companies who seek a competitive
edge through wrongful use of information from the former employer's computer system."); cf
United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that "intentionally" within
the meaning of statute, refers to access, rather than damage).
69 See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 2489 (1986) (rationalizing need for limited applicability of
CFAA to any instance involving data modification by another). The Senate Report goes on to
state that "[s]ome modifications or alterations, while constituting 'damage' in a sense, do not
warrant felony-level punishment, particularly when almost no effort or expense is required to
restore the affected data to its original condition." Id. at 2488. Further, Congress intended §
1030(a)(5) to be applied broadly to "'outsiders,' i.e., those lacking authorization to access any
Federal interest computer" as it removed intentionality requirements for outside hackers. See id.
(explaining intended applicability of act); see also S. REP. No. 104-357, at *10-11 (1996)
(explaining intentionality requirement distinction between insiders and outsiders).
The
Committee noted that insiders would face liability only if damage was intentionally caused, not
recklessly or otherwise. S. REP. No. 104-357, at *11.
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form of criminal statutes allowing for civil remedies. 70 The Massachusetts

statute prohibits "knowingly access[ing] a computer system by any means,
or after gaining access to a computer system by any means know[ing] that
such access is not authorized and fails to terminate such access ... ,,71I
As part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),
the Stored Communications Act (SCA) provides criminal penalties for
anyone who intentionally accesses electronically stored information
without or exceeding authorization.7 2 Similarly, the ECPA provides a
private right of action against whoever "intentionally intercepts, [or]
endeavors to intercept .

.

. any wire, oral, or electronic communication"

without the consent of the plaintiff. 7 As a result, all attempts to monitor,
intercept, or access without authorization, a service that provides users the
ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications, are
impermissible under the SCA and ECPA.74 In the First Circuit, the
beneficiary of the consent exception has the burden of proving consent was

70

See

NAT'L

CONF.

OF

STATE

LEGISLATURES,

Computer

Crime

Statutes,

http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-infonnation-technology/computerhacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx (last updated Jun. 27, 2014) (listing states with
computer trespass and hacking statutes).
71 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120F (2012) (invoking criminal liability for knowingly
accessing computer without authorization, and failing to terminate such access). Violations of the
statute are found for each unauthorized login to the computer, rather than violations for each
document accessed. See Commonwealth v. Piersall, 853 N.E.2d 210, 248 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)
(setting aside separate convictions for each email accessed, and upholding convictions for each

login).

72 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2012) ("[W]hoever intentionally accesses without authorization a
facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or intentionally exceeds
an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access
to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be
punished as provided under subsection (b)....").
71 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a), 2520 (2012). The ECPA and SCA share definitions for relevant
terms, such as "electronic communications" and "electronic communications service." 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2511 (2013) (providing definitions for ECPA & SCA terms). The consent exception to §
251 1(1)(a) is as follows: "where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act...." § 2511(2)(d). "Federal courts have equated 'consent' under the
Wiretap Act with 'authorization' under the Stored Communications Act." Pietrylo v. Hillstone
Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754(FSH), 2008 WL 6085437, at *3 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008).
74 See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2012) (prohibiting unauthorized access or access exceeding
authority of electronic communications service); § 2510(15) (defining "electronic
communications service"). "Electronic communications" are defined as a "transfer of signals ...
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted ... by a wire, radio, [or] electromagnetic ...
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce .
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012). Excluded
from this definition are communications from a tracking device, relevant for a later discussion of
employers wishing to monitor the location of employees through an employee's personal device
used for business purposes. C( 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012).
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received, and this exception is to be construed broadly. 75 Claims asserting

SCA violations typically result from the accessing of a web-based email,
discussion forum, or data storage service by an unauthorized party.76
Further, applicability of the statute typically hinges on definitional
interpretations of "facility" and "electronic storage," as the statute is vague
and has been interpreted in varying breadths. 7
B. Public Employee Expectations of Privacy in Employee PersonalDevices
Used to Conduct Employer's Business
Public employees enjoy constitutional privacy protections, and can
invoke the Fourth Amendment against state and federal government
employers.78 In order to maintain a legal right to privacy, a person must

75 See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2003) (examining consent exception to
ECPA and lack of articulated position of pleading burden regarding consent). The Pharmatrak
court suggests the burden is on the party seeking to benefit from the consent exception, as the
prosecution was the beneficiary and had the burden to prove consent. In re Pharmatrak,Inc., 329
F.3d at 19. In a New Jersey federal district court, the consent exception to the SCA was not
fulfilled despite an employer's claims that it had received verbal consent from the employee prior
to accessing an online discussion forum using the employee's provided login credentials.
Pietrylo, 2008 WL 6085437, at *3-4 (awarding punitive damages against employer for violating
SCA despite employee's verbal consent). But see Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st
Cir. 1990) ("Congress intended the consent requirement to be construed broadly.").
76 See Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 759 F. Supp. 2d 417
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (considering SCA violation with respect to employer access of employee's
personal web-based email account). In Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc., an employer logged in to
several of the former employee's web-based email services using the log-in credentials stored in
the computer, and subsequently discovered the former employee's intentions of starting a new
business. See Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 420. The employer sued the
former employee, seeking to enjoin the opening of a competing business, resulting in the former
employee's counterclaim based on violations of the SCA. Id. at 421-22. The court granted
summary judgment in the employee's favor, finding violations of the SCA for each of the
employee's web-based email services accessed by the employer. Id. at 432.
77 See Mahoney v. DeNuzzio, No. 13-11501-FDS, 2014 WL 347624, at *4 (D. Mass Jan. 29,
2014) (citing interpretation dichotomies of "in electronic storage" and "facility"). Mahoney first
cites courts finding "that using a computer to obtain access to an email on a server without
authorization falls within the ambit of the SCA." Id.; see Cheng v. Romo, No. 11-10007-DJC,
2013 WL 6814691 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 2013) (determining "electronic storage" definition applied
to e-mails on Yahoo! server); In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1057 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) ("[T]he computer system of an email provider ... or an ISP are uncontroversial
examples of facilities that provide electronic communications services to multiple users....").
78 See Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (holding Fourth
Amendment is applicable to government employers); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717
(1987) ("[I]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the
government instead of a private employer...."); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489
U.S. 602, 612-14 (1989) ("[T]he [Fourt]h Amendment guarantees privacy, dignity, and security
of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those
acting at their direction....").
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have a subjective expectation of privacy, and that expectation must be
objectively reasonable. 79 In a plurality opinion, the court established two
analytical frameworks for determining the reasonable privacy expectations
of government employees.80 The first framework determined expectations
of privacy first by examining the "operational realities of the workplace",
necessitating a case-by-case review to determine the reasonableness of the
employee's expectation. 8 ' If a legitimate privacy expectation exists, a
government employer's intrusion for "noninvestigatory, work-related
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct"
is
2
judged by a standard of reasonableness under the circumstances."
Justice Scalia established a different approach in his concurrence,
dispensing with the "operational realities" approach, and concluded "that
the offices of government employees . . . are covered by the Fourth
'
Amendment as a general matter."83
Scalia continued, noting "government
searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of
workplace rules" do not violate the Fourth Amendment, provided that these
searches 8would
be normal and reasonable if performed by a private
4
employer.
Employee expectations of privacy in employer-owned equipment
are fully examined in City of Ontariov. Quon,85 where Quon, a city police
officer was found not to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in an
employer-owned, alphanumeric pager capable of sending text messages.86
Quon was told of a universal policy that the employer "reserves the right to
monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and internet use, with

79 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan-J.,
concurring) (proffering

what was subsequently adopted as test for determining existence of legitimate expectations of
privacy). This precedent was, however, established in contemplation of criminal investigations,
and due to the "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement," the warrant and
probable-cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment is "impracticable" for government
employers. See Ol'Connor, 480 U.S. at 724-25; see also City of Ontario v.Quon, 560 U.S. 746,

756-57 (2010) (recognizing precedent finding employers have needs distinguishable from typical
Fourth Amendment application).
80 See O'Connor,480 U.S. at725-32.

"' See id.
at 717-18. Operational realities can diminish an employee's expectation of privacy,
which should be taken into consideration when assessing the reasonableness of a workplace
search. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671 (finding urine testing did not violate employee right to
privacy).
82

O'Connor,480 U.S. at 725-26.

83

Id.at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 732.

14

"' 560 U.S. 746 (2010).

City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 750-51 (2010). Quon was a member of the City's
SWAT team, and was given the device to better accommodate the exigencies of responding to
emergency situations. Id.
86
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or without notice. Users should have no expectation of privacy or
confidentialitywhen using these resources."87 After Quon was notified of
recurring overage charges from the excessive use of his pager, his
messages were audited without notice, incidentally revealing that he was
sending sexually explicit text messages while on-duty.8 8 Quon was
disciplined by his employer, to which he responded with a claim alleging
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and the SCA.89 The Supreme
Court overruled the Ninth Circuit, stating that Quon had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the employer-owned device, and even if he did,
the Fourth Amendment was not violated by obtaining and reviewing the
transcripts. 90 The Court reasoned that the search was predicated on

reasonable grounds for the employer to believe a search was necessary for
a "noninvestigatory work-related purpose," and that the search was
"'reasonably related to [its] objectives ... and not excessively intrusive in
light of the circumstances giving rise to the search. '"9i
C. PrivateEmployee Expectations of Privacy in their Employee-Owned
Devices Usedfor Conducting Business
The aforementioned invocation of the Fourth Amendment may not
be asserted to claim a right to privacy in the private employer context; the
right to privacy in private employment is subject to state statutes and
common law protections from invasions of privacy.92 In Massachusetts, an
Id. at 751.
88 Id.at 752-53. The message transcripts were requested and audited by the employer to
determine if the current service contract, possibly not substantial enough, was charging for workrelated or personal use. Id.
89 Id. at 753-54
90 Id.at 760-61. The Court first looked to the operational realities, noting the importance of
17

the consistency and presentation of employer policies, the perceived authority of those
establishing the policies, as well as the justifications for the search. Id. at 760-61. Justice Scalia
again joined the opinion except for Part III-A of the opinion which used the "operational realities"
framework for determining the permissibility of the search. Id. at 767-69 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia advocated his threshold inquiry that the
Fourth Amendment "applies in general to such messages on employer-issued pagers," rather than
inquiring as to whether the Fourth Amendment applies to messages on public employees'
employer-issued pagers." Id.at 767.
91 City of Ontario, 560 U.S. at 761 (finding searchby Quon's employer to be reasonable).
92 See Folmsbee v. Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc., 630 N.E.2d 586, 589 (Mass. 1994)
("[B]ecause [plaintiff's employer] is a private employer, [plaintiffs] rights under art. 14 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
are not implicated."); Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 532 N.E.2d 49, 51 n.3 (Mass. 1989) ("Bally
asserts his rights under the statutes because he proceeds here against a private institution."). In
Folmsbee, a drug testing policy was found not to invade the employee's privacy given the nature
of the employer's business, the evidence of employee drug use, and the procedural safeguards in
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employee has "a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious
interference with his privacy."93 This right to privacy, however, is subject
to the "legitimate countervailing business interests" of the employer,
allowing for disclosure of personal information reasonable in certain
situations.94 Relevant factors in determining the gravity of the employer's
interest include the nature of the employer's business and the specific
employee's duties, as well as the95interest in protecting corporate property
and preventing corporate liability.
IV. ANALYSIS
Given the aforementioned liabilities arising from employee
personal device-use in the workplace, employers must decide whether to
outright prohibit the use of employee-owned devices to conduct business,
allow such device use to continue unregulated, or to construct a personal
device-use policy, typically referred to as a BYOD policy. 96
The
proceeding sections will analyze to what extent, if at all, the use of
employee-owned devices, rather than employer-owned devices, changes an
employee's expectation of privacy, and sovereignty over their devices, and
the resultant effect this has on defense litigation regarding invasion of
privacy and unauthorized access claims against an employer. 97 Further,
recommendations will be made for employers wishing to insulate
themselves from liability arising from the sanctioned or unsanctioned use
of personal devices in the workplace. 98 Upon conclusion of this analysis, it
place to guarantee privacy in the intrusion. Folmsbee, 630 N.E.2d at 590.
93 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § lB (2012) ("A person shall have a right against
unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy. The superior court shall have
jurisdiction in equity to enforce such right and in connection therewith to award damages.").
94 See Bratt v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 135 (Mass. 1984) (holding that
required answering of questionnaire used as basis for psychiatric evaluation violated privacy
rights). Butcf Hastings & Sons Publ'n Co. v. Treasurer of Lynn, 375 N.E.2d 299, 303-04 (Mass.
1978) ("[E]ven if disclosure of municipal payroll records would bring the right of privacy into
play, the paramount right of the public to know what its public servants are paid must prevail.").
9' See Bratt, 467 N.E.2d at 135 ("[T]he employer's legitimate interest in determining the
employees' effectiveness in their jobs should be balanced against the seriousness of the intrusion
on the employees' privacy."); see also Webster v. Motorola, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 203, 206-08 (Mass.
1994) (finding employer's interest sufficient to justify intrusion). Webster involved employees
with two different positions, necessitating separate determinations of reasonableness based upon
factual inquiries as to the peculiarities of the job duties of each employee and the interests of the
employer served by the intrusion. Webster, 637 N.E.2d at 207-08.
96 Cf sources cited supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (discussing BYOD trend and its
impact).
97 See supra Part IV (discussing variances in interpretation of privacy statutes).
98 See infra notes 103-110, 126-131 and accompanying text (providing policy drafting
recommendations for employers permitting or prohibiting personal device use).
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will be argued that personal device use for the conducting of employer
business is a risk capable of mitigation through regulation, however the
implementation of BYOD programs should only occur under circumstances
conducive to regulation, or where regulation is not necessary. 99 Although
all of the issues raised in the preceding sections could be resolved through
prohibition of personal device use by employees, it must be assumed that
despite prohibitions, many employees still often conduct business on their
personal devices.100
Commonplace in employment policies are clauses that permit the
employer to remotely clear employer data from devices in the event a
device is lost, stolen, or the employee leaves the company.10 1 The deletion
however, absent a bifurcated, containerized data storage system to
distinguish employee-personal data and an employer's information, could
result in the deletion of all information contained on the device. 0 2
Employees surprised by the deletion of all personal photos, contacts, music,
and books on their devices, it has been argued, may bring a claim asserting
violation of the CFAA, arguing that the employer was not authorized to
access their devices to that extent, or at all, ultimately causing damage or
loss. 103
A court's interpretation of "without authorization," as it is not
defined in the statute, is vital in determining an employer's liability in a
claim brought by an aggrieved employee. 0 4 The First Circuit has not
formally articulated its interpretation of "authorization" or "without
10 5
authorization" under the CFAA, however case law does provide insight.
Judges of the Massachusetts U.S. District Courts have advocated for

99 See infra Part V (arguing strict regulation of personal device use if data is subject to

government regulation).
100 See Drolet, supra note 5 (noting fifty-seven percent of employees use personal devices for
employer business despite prohibitions against their use); Kaneshige, supra note 60 (finding more
than half of employees storing or transferring employers' documents on personal device).
101See MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at 14 (citing remote wiping of devices as common
feature of Mobile Device Management software security protocols).
102 See id. (explaining mechanics of remote data wipes via Mobile Device Management
software).
103

See id. (describing instance where CFAA may be applicable to BYOD programs). The

authors note that their firm is "aware of two recent cases where employers have received demand
letters from terminated employees whose dual-use devices had been remotely wiped by the
employer's IT personnel without the terminated employee's prior authorization." Id.
104

See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting significance of accesser's lack of

authority in finding liability). However, "exceeds authorized access" is defined as "mean[ing] to

access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter...." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
105 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting discrepancy between First Circuit
courts in interpreting meaning of "without authorization" in CFAA analyses).
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varying breadths of interpretation of the applicability
of the CFAA with
0 6
regard to the meaning of "without authorization."
The advocates of a broad interpretation, such as the Guest-Tek
court, believe an expanded breadth of the interpretation of "without
authorization", was justified by the consistent amendments to the CFAA by
Congress and subsequent expansion through "the enactment of a private
cause of action and a more liberal judicial interpretation of the statutory
provisions.
Further, proponents argue that the CFAA's inclusion of an
"'intent to defraud' requirement . . . effectively differentiated between
harmless workplace procrastination and more serious" offenses. 108 The
innocuous deletion of an employee's dual-use device or other monitoring
necessitating access, predicated on the employer's aforementioned
obligation to safeguard personal data or confidential or proprietary
information, would likely invoke the CFAA10 9under a broad analysis guided
by an opinion in alignment with Guest-Tek.
The broad interpretation of the CFAA's applicability in the
employee privacy context would be erroneous.1"0
Legislative history
indicates that the CFAA contemplated deterrence of computer crime by
hackers and the abuse of authority by insiders."'
The CFAA was
prompted by the 1983 hacking of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer
Center's computer system, where adolescent hackers gained access to
radiology records and the ability to alter radiation levels received by
patients .
The same CFAA should not be applicable in the employee
privacy context, a far cry from the nefarious acts prompting passage of the
legislation, such as the hacking of the Department of Defense, NASA, and

106

See supra note 68 and accompanying text (outlining varying interpretations of CFAA's

applicability in First Circuit).
107 Guest-Tek Interactive Entm't, Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2009)
(advocating for broader interpretation of CFAA applicability).
108 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Feldstein, 951 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218 (D. Mass. 2013)
(expressing fear of distorting purpose of CFAA through broad interpretation of "without
authorization").
109 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing broad interpretation
jurisprudence).
110 See infra notes 111-113 and accompanying text (arguing CFAA inappropriately applied
in certain contexts).
111See supra note 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing generally CFAA); see also S.
REP. No. 99-432, at 2480-81 (1986) (noting agreement with ABA's support of statute deterring

computer crime).
112 See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 2480-81 (discussing legislative history of CFAA). The
Judiciary Committee, along with the ABA, "strongly agreed" with the proposition that the CFAA
would deter future computer crime, however the obligation to implement effective safeguards
ultimately lied with private businesses. Id.
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financial institutions. 113
The narrower, and frankly, more persuasive interpretation
advocated in the Advanced Micro Devices analysis is predicated on the
aversion to extending applicability of the CFAA to innocuous violations of
a contractual obligation regarding computer use, as any deviation from the
obligations of one party to another may invoke the "without authorization"
provisions of the CFAA where computers are involved." 4 The Advanced
Micro Devices court argued that "expanding the definition of authorization
to encompass extrinsic contractual agreements has far-reaching and
undesirable consequences, such as potentially transforming idle internet
browsing at work into a federal crime."" 5
In sections of the CFAA where no language requiring nefarious
intent is present, such as section 1030(a)(5)(C), the distinction between
innocuous computer use and criminal activity is less easily made under a
broad interpretation of "without authorization." ' 6 The legislative history
cited clearly evinces Congress's desire to criminalize nefarious computerrelated crimes and abuses, rather than innocuous access to secure corporate
data, and therefore presents the most logical argument for distinguishing
the CFAA's applicability in the BYOD context." 7
The lack of
intentionality in (a)(5)(A)'s catchall is clarified by the Judiciary
Committee's distinction that "insiders, who are authorized to access a
computer, face criminal liability only if they intend to cause damage to the
computer, not for recklessly or negligently causing damage. By contrast,
outside hackers ... could be punished for any intentional, reckless, or other
damage they cause by their trespass."" 8
While Littler has reported that it is aware of two demand letters
sent by aggrieved BYOD employees asserting CFAA violations, it is
unlikely that these claims would survive distinction of the broad

113

See supra note 67-69 (explaining history of CFAA).

114 See supra note 68 and accompany text (interpreting "without authorization").
115

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Feldstein, 951 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217-18 (D. Mass. 2013)

(expressing fear of distorting purpose of CFAA through broad interpretation of "without

authorization"); see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C) (2012) ("[W]hoever intentionally accesses a
protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage or
loss.").
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d at 218 ("It is obviously absurd to impose
criminal liability for checking personal email at the workplace, or some similarly innocuous
116

violation of an employee computer use agreement. Nor is it acceptable to rely solely upon
prosecutorial discretion to refrain from prosecuting trivial offenses.").
117 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (defining language and legislative intent of
CFAA).

11"See S. REP.No. 104-357, at *10-11 (1996); see also supra notes 67-70 and accompanying
text (discussing legislative history of CFAA).
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interpretation of the CFAA in the employment context to allow federal
offenses to arise from actions lacking the insidious nature that the CFAA
was crafted to punish. 119 Presumably, the objective of the employer's
access to an employee's device is to prevent the misappropriation of trade
secrets and the protection of information requiring enhanced protection by
its statutory obligee. 20 The failure of the broad interpretation of the
CFAA's applicability fails to distinguish between innocuous accesses of
devices to ensure information security and nefarious accesses resulting in
the misappropriation of trade secrets by a departing employee, is indicative
of its needed distinction from application to BYOD policies.121 Employers
must advocate for the application of this narrower applicability of the
CFAA, as it limits the exposure of the employer and increases the
employee's burden in pleading the necessary
elements of the CFAA, absent
22
any obvious wrongdoing by the employer. 1
Despite the arguments as to whether or not the CFAA should be
made applicable to BYOD programs, employers are able, and must take
measures to limit exposure under a possible application of the broad
interpretation of "without authorization" under the CFAA, before litigation
comes to fruition in the unsettled First Circuit. 123 By having at least some
employee authorization obtained through a signed employment policy, an
employer can greatly limit its liability, as one court has held section
1030(a)(5), applicable to remote deletion of device memory, noted that the
"exceeding authorization" language's absence bars applicability where at
least some level of authorization is obtained. 124 However, this will not
apply to employer monitoring of information, as section 1030(a)(2)(C)
does contain such language, and sufficient authorizations will be

119

See

MATHIASON ET AL.,

supra note 4, at 14; see also Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 951

F. Supp. 2d at 218 (expressing fear of distorting purpose of CFAA through broad interpretation of
"without authorization"). "There is no express indication ...that Congress intended for

employers to sue ...
to recover economic damages resulting from time spent looking at personal
emails instead of working. However, any information stored on any computer can satisfy the
textual requirements of § 1030(a)(2)(C)." Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
120 Cj MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at 47 (recommending wiping lost/stolen devices
among other security measures through employer's remote management of devices).
121 See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d at 217-18 (discussing interpretations
of CFAA).
122 See supra notes 108-121 and accompanying text (arguing that applicability of CFAA is
distinguishable in First Circuit).
123

See cases cited supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text (discussing broad

interpretation of CFAA's applicability); see also infra Part V (recommending certain policy
language to preclude CFAA claims).

124See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[N]either subsection
(a)(3) nor (a)(5) punishes conduct that exceeds authorization. Both punish a person who
'accesses' 'without authorization' certain computers.").
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125

required.
Employers must draft into their BYOD device acceptable use
policies so that the employer will remotely wipe the employee's BYOD
device in the event of a lost or stolen device, or when the employee leaves
the company, and that such device clearing may result in the loss or
damage to an employee's personal data or information. 126 Further,
employers must obtain written authorization that thoroughly enumerates
what data monitoring measures devices are subject to, as the failure to
enumerate all monitoring measures may result in a finding of exceeded
authorization. 127 Finally, BYOD program policies should require written
authorization of such access by the employer, and the employee's
acknowledgement of the possibility of the loss of personal data or damage
to the device resulting from such access, with election into the program
128
contingent on such written acknowledgement and authorization.
Properly drafted policies gut any possible claims asserting CFAA
violations, as no ambiguity
will exist as to sufficiency of authorization, or
29
the employer's intention. 1
Liability under the SCA may be invoked where the employer
accesses an employee's personal email, online forum, or cloud-based
storage tethered to the BYOD device. 30 Because the employee, not the
employer, is the subscriber to these web-based services, the SCA would
criminalize unauthorized access by the employer to the
information stored
13 1
data.
the
owns
party
which
of
regardless
them,
within
In litigation surrounding instances where the employer has
accessed the aforementioned web-based electronic communications
services such as Yahoo!, Gmail, and the like, there is little opportunity to
125

See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012) ("Whoever ... intentionally accesses a computer

without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information from any
protected computer ... shall be punished in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.").
126 MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at 45 (enumerating necessary clauses in employee

device use policies).
127 See id.at 46 (enumerating necessary clauses in employee device use policies).
128 See id. at 13-15, 46-49 (discussing BYOD liabilities and their mitigation under proper
policy drafting).
129 Id.
130 See id. at 14-15 (discussing applicability of SCA to BYOD programs). Email, discussion
boards, and cloud-based data storage will be referred to interchangeably as web-based
communication services. See id.
131 See MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at 14-15 (providing practical examples of where
SCA liability exposure may arise); see also In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d
1040, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding iPhone fails to constitute "facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided"); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.
Supp. 2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding information stored on plaintiffs' hard drives failed to
fit statutory definition of "interim storage").
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refute the applicability of the SCA, as these are traditionally regarded as
appropriate applications for the SCA by the courts. 3 2 However, in
scenarios where the ambit of the SCA might not be so clear, courts have
been inconsistent in their treatment of unauthorized access of electronic
communications.' 33 The applicability of the SCA, in the BYOD context,
will likely hinge on the statutory interpretations
of the definitions for
134
"facility" and "in electronic storage.',
The legislative history of the SCA examined by the DoubleClick
Inc. court and its iteration in iPhone Application Litigation presents the
most supportive argument for this proposition, finding that the legislative
history of the SCA is indicative of Congress' intention only to protect
electronic communications while in temporary storage with the service
provider waiting for delivery, and not those stored on individual users'
computers at their endpoint. 135 Because the messages are typically stored
on the flash memory or hard drive of the device, and not on the provider's
servers, employers should not face liability under the SCA for their access
of the electronic communications that are stored on the device itself. 136
Although the above argument has been accepted by the courts,
foreboding language in a recent opinion by a U.S. District Court in
Massachusetts could be problematic for employers engaged in monitoring
employee owned devices. 137 The defendant argued that the use of a nonweb based client, such as Microsoft Outlook that downloads

132

See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ("[T]he

computer systems of an email provider, a bulletin board system, or an ISP are uncontroversial
examples of facilities that provide electronic communications services to multiple users....").
133

See supra note 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing varying treatment of SCA

language by the courts).
134 See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (defining terms applicable to SCA).
135 See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (discussing limited
definition of Title II); In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1059 ("this location data

resides on Plaintiffs' iPhone hard drive for up to a one-year period, which is not merely a
'temporary, intermediate storage ... incidental to the electronic transmission' of an electronic
communication.").
136 See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 2003); United States
v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (discussing data storage); Pure Power Boot
Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("The majority
of courts which have addressed the issue have determined that e-mail stored on an electronic

communication service provider's systems after is has been delivered, as opposed to e-mail stored
on a personal computer, is a stored communication subject to the SCA.") (holding search of
emails stored in Nationwide's information technology systems exempt); see also Mahoney v.
DeNuzzio, No. 13-11501-FDS, 2014 WL 347624, at *10 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2014) (finding that
computers at issue did not constitute "facility" within meaning of SCA).
137 See Cheng v. Romo, No. 11-10007-DJC, 2013 WL 6814691, at *4-5 (D. Mass. Dec. 20,
2013) (rejecting defendant's argument that use of software which received emails negates liability

under SCA).
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communications to the personal computer from the service provider,
exempted her from liability on the grounds that the messages are no longer
stored "by an electronic communications service for purposes of backup
protection," but stored by the non-web based client. 38 The court rejected
this argument, despite its support in another jurisdiction, stating that
liability should not hinge on the plaintiffs choice of software used to
access an email account.' 39 The court's reasoning, that the "clear intent of
the SCA was to protect a form of communication in which citizenry clearly
has a strong reasonable expectation of privacy," represents a significant
departure from the literal approach of prior decisions in very technically
0
distinguishing what types of communications were covered by the SCA.14
Regardless of whether or not the Cheng court was correct in
deciding as it did, the decision nonetheless illustrates the need for
protective policy drafting by employers in an effort to mitigate the risks of
uncertain litigation. 141 In drafting such policies, employers must consider
the mechanics of the statute's language, as well as the risks they are
seeking to mitigate, rather than simply enumerating prohibited conduct and
assuming the employee infers what type of monitoring such prohibitions
would require.
Participation in the BYOD program should be contingent
on conspicuous clauses in employee personal device use policies, coupled
with a written acknowledgement of such terms.141
In the private employment context, employee expectations of
privacy are subject to the "legitimate countervailing business interests" of
the employer, with such interests determined by factors such as the nature
of the employer's business, the employee's duties, as well as the interest in
preventing liability and damage to corporate property. 144 In the public
employment context, privacy expectations are limited by the operational
realities of the workplace, and if reasonable, such operational realities

138 Id. at *4 (noting distinction between PC-based Outlook software and electronic Hotmail

service as backup to Outlook).
139 See id. at *5 (rejecting reasoning of Weaver); cf Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-1 104, 2012
WL 4049484, at *7 n. 21 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2012) ("[A] person's email should not be excluded
from ECPA protection merely because of the mechanism by which the email system operates").
140 See Cheng, 2013 WL 6814691 at *5 (rejecting accesser's definitional distinction
argument on grounds that it defied Congressional intent).
141 Cf id. at *4-5 (providing counterarguments to inapplicability of SCA in certain BYOD

contexts).
142

See generally supra Part IV (discussing liability employers face contingent on judicial

interpretation of SCA's language).
143 See MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 4, at 14-15 (discussing services subject to SCA
provisions).
144 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (defining employee expectations of privacy
and private employer's justifications for their limitation).
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justify employer intrusions for "noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct.', 145 While previous
sections discussing generally an employee's right to privacy were separated
based on the differing analytical frameworks of the public and private
employment relationships, this analysis will address them together, noting
incongruence where it arises, as they ultimately achieve similar privacy
protection goals. 146 Due to the dearth of on-point case law regarding
privacy expectations of employees using personally owned devices, privacy
expectations in various instances will be analyzed by way of analogy of
employer-owned devices, with
any predicted variance based on the
1 47
difference in ownership noted.
To understand the strength of the citizenry's expectation of privacy
in its communications, one need look no further than the legislative history
of the Stored Communications Act. 1 48 In the absence of such a statute
however, employer monitoring of communications will generally be
permissible if done in a reasonable manner to achieve the employer's
legitimate countervailing business interests. 149 However, it should be noted
that an employer's level of liability under a privacy claim is less certain
where it fails to notify the employee that the device is under surveillance,
as employees could more likely be found to have expectations of privacy
when the device is personally owned. 150
City of Ontario likely provides the most insight on employee
privacy expectations in the BYOD context. 151 While the Supreme Court
See O'Connorv. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 710 (1987).
Compare supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (permitting searches for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes and investigations of work-related misconduct if
reasonable), with supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (noting right to privacy is subject to
employer's legitimate business interest, to a reasonable extent).
147 See supra Part IV (discussing potential judicial treatment of BYOD related privacy claims
arising from various monitoring measures).
148See Cheng v. Romo, No. 11-10007-DJC, 2013 WL 6814691, at *4-5 (D. Mass. 2013)
("[T]he clear intent of the SCA was to protect a form of communication in which the citizenry
clearly has a strong reasonable expectation of privacy.").
149 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (discussing employee expectations of
privacy in private employment).
150See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (noting that there may be an
expectation of privacy if employee purchases its own device).
151 See id at 759 (assuming, arguendo, that employee had expectation of privacy in
employer-supplied equipment). The court demonstrates the sensitivity of privacy expectations to
their context, cautioning against perceiving their decision to promulgate some guidance on the
permissibility of monitoring by employers:
145

146

Prudence counsels caution before the facts in this case are used to establish far-reaching
premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations of employees using
employer-provided communication devices.
Rapid changes in the dynamics of
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cautioned against according too much reverence to their decision, their
language used in dicta provides guidance as to how personal devices may
change an employee's expectation of privacy, stating "[c]ell phone and text
message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider
them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression,
even
That might strengthen the case for an expectation
of "self-identification.
,,112
of privacy.
The Court provided a counter to this argument, stating that
the ubiquity and resultant affordability of these devices allows employees
to pursue a personal device if they wished to keep matters private. 153 An
employee's personal device may serve as a receptacle of highly personal
information and even a means of self-expression; however, the employee,
by electing to participate in a BYOD program, does to a certain extent avail
itself to lesser privacy by waiving the opportunity
to use employer-issued
54
equipment and participate in a BYOD program. 1
Where an employee is required to supply its own device however,
this argument may not be as persuasive, and careful policy drafting and
155
careful communication and treatment of the device's use will be critical.
Because Quon's employer allowed its officers to treat their employer
supplied equipment as their own, and abstained from auditing provided that
overages were paid, the Ninth Circuit found that Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to his communications. 156 As a result,
employers must clearly and conspicuously communicate in their policies
that all electronic communications, including email, text messages, voice

communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself
but in what society accepts as proper behavior. At present, it is uncertain how workplace

norms, and the law's treatment of them, will evolve.
Id.
152

Id. at 760 (describing reasoning and arguments regarding expectation of privacy).

153

See id.

154 See id (proffering that employee's wishing to keep matters private should use personal

devices for personal matters).
155

See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. at 760-61 (discussing role of cell phones in society

and workplace).
156

See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 899, 904-06 (9th Cir. 2009)

(finding reasonable expectation of privacy as matter of law, despite policy conspicuously seeking
its negation). While the Supreme Court avoided this issue when it ruled, it assumed arguendo
that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy, despite an employee policy that they should

have no expectation of privacy in company-owned equipment. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560
U.S. at 760-61 (discussing the role of cell phones in society and workplace). The "Computer
Usage, Internet and E-Mail Policy" at issue provided that the city "reserves the right to monitor
and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice. Users

should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources." Id. at 751.
While text messages weren't explicitly stated in the policy, the employer made clear to employees
that it would treat text messages the same as it treated emails, which were subject to auditing. Id.
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calls, or voice mail; information, whether stored on the device, remotely
via cloud storage, or on social media will be subject to monitoring, and that
the employee should have no expectation of privacy in any of the
aforementioned matters. 5 7 However, equally important is communicating
to the employee that it will engage only in monitoring to exact a specific,
legitimate business interest, and that monitoring will achieve that
regulatory goal. 158 This can be achieved through the modification of
existing policies, such as confidentiality policies, social media policies, and
acceptable use policies, as well as drafting a separate and distinct personal
device use policy. 159 Finally, employers and their legal representatives
must remember that the courts will not simply take the employer's privacy
policies on their face and apply them to the aggrieved employee's privacy
claim to determine the existence of a privacy expectation. 160 The City of
Ontario v. Quon decision made very clear that employer policies will be
"shaped by the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially to
the extent that such policies are clearly communicated.'161 As a result, it is
paramount that employers not only responsibly draft privacy-related
policies, but that the62 policies are communicated and regarded consistently
with their drafting. 1

V. CONCLUSION
While commentators have argued that federal anti-hacking and
privacy laws pose a significant issue in the monitoring of employees, courts
would err in applying such laws in the workplace IT context. Except for
actual nefarious conduct by an employer, application of the CFAA in this
context would bastardize the CFAA's intention in obviating the
bootstrapping of enforcement efforts against hackers. In addition to the
relevant respects aforementioned, the SCA is prehistoric relative to the
current state of workplace technology, casting applicability of the SCA
over technologies not contemplated or fitting under the Act. As a result,
courts must be weary to apply these laws to rapidly evolving, modem
iterations of now-archaic IT infrastructure.
157

See

MATHIASON

ET

AL.,

supra note 4, at 45-48 (providing policy drafting

recommendations to employers).
158 See id. (same).
159 See id. (same).
160 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. at 758 (finding that inquiry into operational
realities is needed regardless of communicated employer policy).
161Id. at 760 (stating that employer policies are not simply analyzed as written).
162 See id. (stating that employee policies are shaped to extent that they are clearly
communicated).
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The vast inconsistencies in judicial treatment of employee privacy
and the uncertainty of how courts will treat the inevitable BYOD
predicated lawsuits creates significant issues for employers. Fortunately,
employers have sufficient mechanisms at their disposal to greatly reduce
the likelihood of litigation through precise and transparent policy drafting.
Obtaining employee authorizations that permit an employer to access,
modify, or monitor any and all information on the device likely negates
applicability of both the SCA and CFAA in almost any context. Further,
conspicuously stating that they should have no expectation of privacy in the
device greatly stunts the viability of privacy claims by employees, as any
subjective expectation of privacy would be objectively unreasonable given
the notice provided by the employer.
While employees would likely resent a seemingly Orwellian
surveillance program instituted by the employer, employers can address
these concerns via the traditional provision of a company owned device at
no cost of the employee. However, simply providing this employee with a
company-owned device does not exact the compliance goals of employers
that are subject to strict sensitive data protection obligations. To truly
ensure protection of sensitive corporate information, employers must
prohibit and discipline the use of unregulated employee personal devices in
the workplace, as the use of these devices defeats the security provided by
the monitoring of business use devices, whether BYOD or company
provided. Failure to prohibit the use of unregulated personal devices is
likely to effectively gut any of the employer's regulatory compliance
schemes, as the flow of sensitive corporate data will be uninhibited. Of
course, these policies and regulatory schemes are not imperative for all
industries, companies, or employees; the recommended regulation of
employee devices is to exact legitimate business interests in preventing
company liability only where it exists.
Andrew Freedman
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